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Erich Rothacker (1888–1965) was a key figure in early-twentieth-century philosophy in 
Germany. In this paper, I examine the development of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture from 
1907 to 1945. Rothacker began his philosophical career with a völkerpsychological 
dissertation on history, outlining his early biologistic conception of culture (1907–1913). In 
his mid-career work, he then turned to Wilhelm Dilthey’s (1833–1911) Lebensphilosophie 
(philosophy of life), advancing a hermeneutic approach to culture (1919–1928). In his later 
work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed a cultural anthropology. I shall argue that 
Rothacker’s later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace 
central aspects of Rothacker’s reception of both Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie. 
The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker’s philosophical development that deserve 
more attention than they have received to date: his reception of Völkerpsychologie and the 
political character of his theories of culture. Rothacker’s theoretical work was closely 
connected to his political conservatism, which culminated in his engagement with National 
Socialism. The paper unearths problematic aspects of the legacy of Völkerpsychologie and 
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work (1929–1945), Rothacker developed a cultural anthropology. I shall argue that 
Rothacker’s later theory of culture retained key motifs of his earlier works. In this way, I trace 
central aspects of Rothacker’s reception of both Völkerpsychologiei and Lebensphilosophie. 
I reconstruct the development of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture in three steps: 
Section 2 outlines Rothacker’s völkerpsychological beginnings (1907–1913). This section 
sketches the intellectual context of his dissertation, analyzes its biologistic concept of culture, 
and highlights the political implications of this view.  
Section 3 explores the middle Rothacker’s turn to Lebensphilosophie (1919–1928). 
The section examines the hermeneutic concept of culture emerging from Rothacker’s study of 
the Diltheyan theory of worldviews. Moreover, here I show the political motivations for 
Rothacker’s theoretical engagement with the legacy of historicism, and show that Rothacker 
identified with the conservative and nationalist tendencies of the historicist movement.   
Finally, section 4 investigates the second fundamental revision of Rothacker’s 
philosophical thought, outlining the methodological and political orientation of his later 
philosophy (1929–1945). Rothacker associated his new theory of culture with the rise of 
National Socialism (NS). This section analyzes the key motifs of Rothacker’s cultural 
anthropology, and highlights the connections between this later work and his earlier 
approaches to culture.   
The paper focuses on two aspects of Rothacker’s philosophical development that have 
not received the attention they deserve to date: (a) the significance of his reception of 
Völkerpsychologie, and (b) the political character of his theories of culture.   
 
a) Rothacker’s Reception of Völkerpsychologie 
 Most commentators do not focus on Rothacker’s völkerpsychological beginnings 
(Koslowski 1997; Böhnigk 2002; Tremmel 2009, 2012; Plas 2011, 2013; Fischer 2008). 
Stöwer’s (2012a) biography sketches the intellectual context of Rothacker’s early work, yet 
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does not connect Rothacker’s first concept of culture with his later approaches (see also 
Stöwer 2012b). Stöwer concentrates on the significance of Dilthey’s hermeneutics for the 
development of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture. This aspect of his work has been well 
researched (see Koslowski 1997; Fischer 2008; Plas 2011, 2013; Stöwer 2012a, 2012b; 
Tremmel 2009, 2012).  
The lack of scholarship on Rothacker’s völkerpsychological beginnings is all the more 
surprising when we bear in mind the central themes of Rothacker’s life-long work and their 
close connections with the general orientation of Völkerpsychologie. Rothacker sought to 
understand the nature of humanity throughout his philosophical career, believing that the 
special character of humanity was revealed in its historical development, where we see 
humanity consistently organized in particular groups with distinctive cultural achievements. 
This common starting point of Rothacker’s philosophical projects is similar to the point of 
view found in Völkerpsychologie. Völkerpsychologie had emerged as a scholarly program in 
the work of German-Jewish scholars Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) and Herman Steinthal 
(1823-1899) (on the development of Völkerpsychologie from 1850 to 1945 see Klautke 2013; 
Kusch 2019). Lazarus and Steinthal regarded the communal life of social groups as the key to 
understanding humanity. They emphasized that human communities, especially Völker, 
developed a common spiritual life (geistiges Leben) and that history was characterized by the 
development of these spirits of Völker (Volksgeister). Lazarus and Steinthal pursued a 
scientific approach to what they regarded as the “objective spirit” (objektiver Geist) of 
communities. They aimed to discover the causal-psychological laws that governed the 
development of humanity, taking “cultural forms” such as myths, religions, arts, and legal 
systems as their focus points. The Völkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal became an 
important model for understanding humanity through history and culture. This general 
orientation also guided the approach of Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), who was the most 
important proponent of the second generation of Völkerpsychologie, publishing the ten 
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volumes of his Völkerpsychologie between 1900 and 1920. Wundt restricted his approach to 
the early stages of communal life and defined language, myth, and customs as the central 
issues of Völkerpsychologie (Wundt 1886/1911). As Lazarus and Steinthal had, Wundt argued 
that the systematic study of collective psychological processes would yield a developmental 
history of humanity. 
 
b) The Political Character of Rothacker’s Theories of Culture 
It is quite surprising that no in-depth examination of the close connection between 
Rothacker’s theories of culture and his political orientation exists. Fischer (2008), Koslowski 
(1997), and Habermas (1958/1973) do not delve at all into the political aspect of Rothacker’s 
philosophy. Plas (2011, 2013) examines the connection between Rothacker’s historicist 
approaches to culture and his conservative leanings, but argues that the same theory could 
have lent itself to progressive policies. In my evaluation, here Plas underestimates the völkisch 
character of Rothacker’s philosophy. The same holds for Tremmel’s (2009, 2012) reading. 
Tremmel acknowledges that Rothacker’s cultural anthropology could open the door for racist 
theories, but does not analyze the political aspect of its key motifs. Stöwer’s (2012a) 
biography gives a detailed account of Rothacker’s political activities during the Weimar 
Republic and the NS period, yet, by explaining Rothacker’s political engagement through 
psychological motifs, Stöwer does not bring to bear the close connections between this 
political activity and Rothacker’s philosophy. Böhnigk (2002) detects a commitment to 
biological racism in Rothacker’s cultural anthropology, though, as I will show, Rothacker’s 
later work did not center on biology. Weber (1989) only considers Rothacker’s public 
engagement in support for nationalist cultural policies, without analyzing Rothacker’s 
philosophical commitments. 
Rothacker is still seen as a key author in philosophical anthropology (Fischer 2008). 
Several commentators praise his culturalist approach to the historicity of humanity, 
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contrasting his emphasis on culture and history with the naturalized concept of ‘humanity’. 
On this reading, naturalistic anthropologies are accused of relying on dogmatic concepts of 
humanity with problematic political consequences (Habermas 1958/1973; Fischer 2008; 
Tremmel 2009; Plas 2011). My paper challenges this popular argument. I show that 
Rothacker justified his political conservativism by biologistic, historicist, and culturalist 
arguments. Moreover, I argue that his different theories of culture were characterized by a 
general pattern of völkisch thinking about humanity. It was this pattern that undergirded 
Rothacker’s problematic political views.   
 
2. The Early Rothacker (1907–1913): Völkerpsychological Beginnings   
 
A preliminary look at Rothacker’s educational background demonstrates that his main 
philosophical interests emerged in the context of Völkerpsychologie.ii The early Rothacker 
engaged intensively with Völkerpsychologie during his studies in Kiel, Strasburg, Munich, 
and Tübingen. In Kiel, Rothacker studied with Götz Martius (1853–1927), a student of 
Wundt. During that time, Rothacker (1909) published a review of recent debates around 
Völkerpsychologie in the renowned Zeitschrift für Angewandte Psychologie (Journal of 
Applied Psychology). He also began to engage with the social-psychological approach to 
cultural history in the work of Karl Lamprecht (1856–1915), a close ally of Wundt. 
Rothacker’s engagement with Lamprecht was the beginning of his dissertation project. In 
1912, Rothacker’s dissertation was published in the important series Contributions to Cultural 
and Universal History, edited by Lamprecht himself.  
Rothacker’s education was profoundly rooted in Völkerpsychologie and in 
Lamprecht’s uses of this tradition. Lamprecht’s German History (1891–1909) presented itself 
as a psychological history of the German nation and prompted the so-called “Lamprecht 
controversy” (see Schorn-Schütte 1984; Raphael 1990; Chickering 1993; Klautke 2013, 73, 
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77 f.). Against the mainstream of contemporary history, Lamprecht’s “cultural history” 
prioritized economic and social history, and focused on collectives rather than individuals. 
Lamprecht believed that nations were the agents of history, and that they developed in clearly 
distinguishable psychological stages. He aimed to identify the causal, statistical laws 
governing this process. Other historians and philosophers of the time accused Lamprecht of 
“positivism” and “materialism,” leaving him with few allies.  
It is surprising that, early on, Rothacker chose Lamprecht’s genetic historiography as 
the starting point of his dissertation in philosophy, attempting to defend and improve 
Lamprecht’s conception. In his dissertation, Rothacker held that history was the cultural 
development of human communities, and that its pattern could be explained biologically, thus 
agreeing with the general orientation of Lamprecht’s “biology of nations.” Yet Rothacker felt 
that Lamprecht had overlooked the physiological foundation of cultural achievements 
(Rothacker 1912, 118 f.). As Rothacker saw it, Lamprecht’s social-psychological approach 
had to be modified into an examination of the physiological laws that governed the cultural 
development of human communities. Rothacker claimed that the same laws of organic 
development governed races, nations, animals, and plants (108). He defined his approach as 
völkerpsychological (33). In contrast to Wundt, but in line with Lazarus and Steinthal, 
Rothacker believed that the higher forms of cultural development—such as science or art—
could be explained by völkerpsychological processes (45). Yet he rejected the reference to 
collective entities such as the Volksseele (soul of the people) as supposed agents of collective 
development, thus agreeing with the critique of Völkerpsychologie that Georg Simmel (1858–
1918) had put forward in his sociological works (48–50, 69 f.).iii Rothacker, however, 
disputed Simmel’s (1908) conclusion that cultural forms always resulted from the interaction 
of individual minds. Rothacker believed in a collective foundation of cultural achievements, 
disagreeing with Simmel’s distinction between the individual-psychological cause and the 
supraindividual result of the cultural process. The early Rothacker rejected sociological 
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explanations in general, skeptical of the suggestion that culture could be caused by the social 
interactions of individuals. For him, the social organization of a community was only an 
external framework that could modify cultural development superficially. Rothacker regarded 
“Völker”, “nations,” “tribes,” “states,” and “cities” as the most important social contexts in 
which cultural developments could manifest in concrete achievements (103–110). These 
social groups were defined as arbitrary associations of individuals. Rothacker believed that 
there were social groups without culture. They lacked the natural disposition for developing 
culture and remained only social organizations (158).  
One reason for this belief lies in Rothacker’s advancement of a biologistic concept of 
culture which considers races to be the key agents of human life. Rothacker defined races as 
natural groups governed by the biological laws of organic growth, and envisaged them as 
flourishing or degenerating like trees (95, 106 f.). He regarded racial dispositions as the 
ultimate cause behind cultural development. On this account, races generated gifted 
individuals capable of developing culture, and concrete cultural achievements in turn 
depended upon individuals with exceptional intellectual capacities (106 f., 125). This explains 
how Rothacker could claim that his biologistic concept of culture constitutes something of a 
middle ground between collectivism and individualism (113 f.).   
If we follow Rothacker, cultural development was an expression of a community’s 
natural development regarding its intellectual capacities. Rothacker defined these capacities 
as “formal” (formale Begabung; 79 f.). He compared their development with the organic 
development of an eye (54), emphasizing that the development of these intellectual capacities 
was first and foremost an organic process (113). This is not an analogy. Rothacker held that 
the physiological make-up of human brains was the key source of cultural development. This 
biologistic rendering of culture was clearly deterministic, and he believed that the intellectual 
capacities of an individual were completely genetically determined. In this context Rothacker 
also maintained that the brains of “primitives” were physiologically inferior, claiming that a 
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“primitive person’s child” raised “among us” would never be capable of belonging to “our 
highest intellectual class” (80 f., 86 f.): “Nobody can go beyond his innate mind” (88). Of 
course, the early Rothacker did not think that all members of a community had the same 
formal capacities, and advocated a quite simple equation: The better your brain, the higher 
your social position, especially within a cultural domain (see, e.g. 51 f., 147–49).  
Rothacker believed that he had discovered the natural foundation of cultural 
differences, and that, from this point of view, he could rank human communities by their 
formal capacities. He was convinced that these formal capacities could be assessed by the 
vitality they exhibit (16, 38 f.). Thus, for example, he followed Lamprecht in assuming that 
the history of Germany since the tenth century was characterized by the development of self-
consciousness, and that this change was brought about by an increase of “mental energy” 
(seelische Energie; 40). He argued that the cultural achievements of communities revealed 
such changes, since they expressed the organic development of their formal capacities (54 f., 
80). Rothacker’s theory also shared the universal scope of Lamprecht’s and Wundt‘s 
approaches to historical development. The early Rothacker envisaged cultural processes as 
continuous developments always following the same formal stages (53). He claimed that these 
empirical regularities could be found in all cultures, forming a clear hierarchy of cultural 
development.  
To illustrate his understanding of cultural development, Rothacker contrasted the 
primitive stage of knowledge with what he regarded as the highest stage. The inferior brain of 
“primitives,” he argued, resulted in the weakness of their formal capacity for knowledge. 
“Primitives” necessarily perceived the world falsely, expressing a distorted cognition of 
reality in their mythological worldviews. Rothacker claimed that this form of knowledge was 
guided by the needs of primitive life, assuming that at the lowest stage, knowledge was 
entirely relative to practical interests (62–66). However, with the organic development of the 
brain, the formal capacity of knowing also improved (see, e.g., 101 f.). At the “highest” 
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cognitive stage, formal capacities enabled humans to gain objective knowledge about the 
world. At this point, knowledge was pursued for its own sake (53 f., 65 f.). Since the highest 
form of knowing was independent of external influences, Rothacker regarded it as absolute 
(109). He argued that the investigations of modern science were characterized by this “purely 
formal, objective, and critical spirit” (71). Early on, Rothacker extended this argument about 
knowledge to the consideration of values, maintaining that absolute values (such as pure 
beauty or pure benevolence) were the expression of highest physiological development of our 
“organ of feeling” (Organ des Fühlens; 115–125). This anti-relativistic tendency of 
Rothacker’s early concepts of knowledge and values is significant in light of his later 
discussions of relativism, taken up below.  
At this point the political undercurrent of Rothacker’s biologistic determinism should 
be obvious: He divided humanity into particular groups and ranked them in terms of an 
assumed “natural” hierarchy of capacities. This hierarchy naturalized cultural and social 
differences. Rothacker’s theory was intended to justify existing power relations within and 
between social groups as natural. We can therefore justifiably say that the early Rothacker 
was a biological racist and a social Darwinist: He assumed that human communities 
developed analogues to organic life. 
From a methodological point of view, the early Rothacker conducted a study that 
corresponds to the so-called “weak program” of Völkerpsychologie (Kusch 2019): He 
searched for biological causal explanations of cultural development, and his biological 
determinism prioritized the community over the individual. He also blurred the lines between 
descriptive explanations and normative interests. He embraced a hierarchical understanding of 
cultural development and was neither an epistemic relativist nor a value relativist. Finally, 
Rothacker showed a hostility towards sociology that was typical of the völkerpsychological 




3. The Middle Rothacker (1919–1928): “Historicist ‘Lebensphilosophie’”  
 
Rothacker’s philosophical orientation changed dramatically after WWI. Following Dilthey, he 
developed a philosophy of the human sciences in the spirit of the Historical School. Rothacker 
published a new Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Human 
Sciences) in 1920 and aimed to complete Dilthey’s project of a philosophical foundation of 
the human sciences in his Logik und Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften (Logic and System 
of the Human Sciences; 1926). Rothacker now favored a hermeneutical approach to cultures 
that emphasized their particularity, historicity, and creativity. He praised the historicist 
concept of the Volksgeist for having captured the very character of cultural productivity. The 
historicists aimed to reveal the “life-concern” (Lebensbezug) of cultural phenomena by 
relating them to the concrete fate of historical agents (Rothacker 1926, 129, 138, 157 f.). 
During this middle period, Rothacker characterized the “hidden philosophy of the Historical 
School” (130) as “historicist ‘Lebensphilosophie’” (147). He retained his earlier dismissal of 
sociology, but now rejected all causal explanations of culture, including all kinds of 
naturalism (see, e.g., 143).  
The mid-career Rothacker was no aberration, and fits within one of the main lines of 
development in German philosophy after WWI. This historical context makes the major shift 
of his philosophical views plausible, but does not explain it sufficiently.iv German 
philosophers’ war-time propaganda associated naturalism with the “Western” culture of 
Germany’s French and British enemies. With Germany’s defeat, critical theories of modernity 
were reinforced, and  the scientific worldview, with its “shallow” causal explanations, became 
identified with the alleged intellectual crisis of the modern mind. Weimar culture thus was 
partly characterized by an anti-scientific mentality, in which Lebensphilosophie flourished as 
a “German” alternative to “Western” thought (see Kusch 1995, 224–252).v In his middle 
period, Rothacker emphasized the distinctively “German tradition” of the Historical School 
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(Rothacker 1920, 277, 1926, 114, 168). In the intellectual context of Weimar, 
Völkerpsychologie declined as an academic discipline searching for the universal laws of 
human development. Thus for example, Felix Krüger, Wundt’s student and successor, 
rejected the term Völkerpsychologie and accused his teacher Wundt of having come too close 
to the “positivism” of “Western” thought (Klautke 2013, 86–88). Krüger even turned to 
Dilthey’s descriptive psychology as a methodological alternative to experimental psychology 
(Kusch 1995, 266–68).  
In his mid-career, Rothacker extended Dilthey’s theory of philosophical worldviews to 
the human sciences and culture in general. He argued that the methodological debates about 
scientific principles reflected fundamental “struggles of life” (1926, 112). The debates 
between naturalists, idealists, and historicists could thus be reduced to ideological differences 
between general worldviews. Like Dilthey, Rothacker distinguished between “naturalism,” an 
“idealism of freedom,” and “objective idealism” (36–67). Rothacker understood these 
worldviews as in conflict with each other, which was not Dilthey’s understanding: Dilthey 
regarded the metaphysical worldviews as different perspectives rooted in distinct general 
attitudes to life, namely cognition, feeling, and volition (Dilthey 1962, 65 f.). To Dilthey, 
these represented different aspects of the world and, hence, were not necessarily in conflict 
with each other. Rothacker, on the other hand, saw these metaphysical worldviews as rooted 
in comprehensive decisions about life. They expressed practical demands and ethical 
postulates that could not be reconciled (137–139). For Rothacker, all knowledge was thus 
guided by normative interests (151).  
During this middle period, Rothacker was aware that his theory of worldviews would 
invite the charge of relativism. In his discussion of the relativistic consequences of his view, 
he distinguished between a “positive” and a “negative” relativism. Rothacker suggested that 
negative relativism was a form of skepticism; it had to be rejected because of its “corrosive” 
(zersetzend) effects (148). Yet, Rothacker embraced “positive relativism” in both 
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epistemology (a) and value theory (b). He employed a similar argument in both cases to show 
that his relativism had no unacceptable consequences.  
 
(a) Epistemology 
For Rothacker, the pursuit of knowledge was always motivated by practical interests 
anchored in worldviews, making truth interest-dependent. He held that the constitutive role of 
interests in knowing added a new dimension to epistemology, one which he tried to bring out 
by distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant truths. Still, Rothacker emphasized that this 
pragmatic criterion of knowledge did not affect the theoretical or empirical correctness of a 
claim: A certain claim may be irrelevant to us, but nevertheless true (144 f.).  
 
(b) Value Theory 
Rothacker admitted that his theory of worldviews followed historicism in 
acknowledging the plurality of values. The choice between different values was also guided 
by the particular interests of agents deciding between different possibilities of life. Rothacker 
maintained that adopting this perspective of life added a new dimension to the philosophical 
question about values: Values could be assessed by their “vitality” (Erlebtheit) and 
“genuineness” (Echtheit). This additional criteria made it possible to decide which values 
were “truly valuable” (wahrhaft wertvoll) in a specific context (147 f.).  
Rothacker’s theory of worldviews was rooted in a specific concept of life, one that 
emphasizes life’s historical and practical character. This he understood in an almost 
existential way, arguing that life put its agents in a concrete situation (Situation) that called 
for a definite action. This necessity to act called for decisions that ground human creativity. 
Rothacker assumed that creative agents could be either collective (the Volksgeist) or 
individual (155–157). This “scheme of productive life” (159, 171) granted creative agents 
more freedom than Rothacker’s early biologistic concept of culture had. Now, in this middle 
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period of his work, Rothacker began to explicitly relativize the influence of hereditary factors 
in cultural production, with an emphasis on their ethical aspects. The sources of productivity, 
“character” and “substance,” were not simply given, but had to be acquired through “self-
creation” and “self-affirmation” (159 f.). Yet he explicitly set his approach apart from an 
individualistic understanding of cultural history, rejecting the idea that cultural development 
rested on the creativity of individual genius only. Rothacker regarded this extreme 
individualism as rooted in strands of romanticism that he rejected (29). He emphasized that 
each individual participates in various “historical” and “spatial” communities. These 
communities are bearers of “historical substances” that shaped spiritual life. The “historical 
substances” could be assessed primarily by reference to their “fecundity” (Fruchtbarkeit). An 
individual could develop a productive attitude only within “historical substances”, and always 
remained trapped within them (164 f., 170 f.). Therefore, while Rothacker in this middle 
period placed collective entities above individuals, he nevertheless rejected a causal 
interpretation of this relationship, maintaining that individual cultural creativity was 
circumscribed by the communal context.  
The last chapter of Rothacker’s Systematics and Logic of the Human Sciences 
(Systematik und Logik der Geisteswissenschaften) shows the political aspect of his 
engagement with the Historical School (168–71; see also 117–119). Rothacker praises this 
movement’s emphasis on the particularity of national cultures as a necessary response to the 
leveling character of the Enlightenment’s universal aspirations. In embracing the value of 
concrete substances, and especially Völker, historicism revealed the productivity of cultural 
particularism. Rothacker closed his systematic treatise with an explicitly political statement, 
claiming that the discoveries of the Historical School entitled philosophers to patriotism 
(171). In a nutshell, the middle Rothacker emphasized the counter-Enlightenment character of 
historicism, and personally identified with its conservative and nationalist tendencies. He 
characterized the historicists as proponents of the “will of a great Volk” in search of its 
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national culture (148). Rothacker saw the deepening of historical consciousness as an 
opportunity to return to the national values of the “German tradition” (Rothacker 1920, 226–
28; see also Plas 2011, 474–476; Stöwer 2012a, 73–75).  
This political orientation is confirmed by Rothacker’s political attitude during the 
Weimar Republic. Stöwer (2012a, 77–81) describes Rothacker’s conduct in the highly 
politicized atmosphere of Heidelberg, where he worked from 1919 to 1929. Rothacker 
explicitly avoided the circle around Marianne and Alfred Weber where many of his liberal 
and socialist colleagues met regularly. He preferred the company of Friedrich Gundolf ,who 
introduced him to the circle gathered around the poet Stefan George (George-Kreis). 
Rothacker shared the elitist and anti-democratic conservativism of many of George’s 
followers. In his autobiography he explained his rejection of the Weimar Republic with his 
strong belief that Germany had been humiliated after World War I (Rothacker 1963, 67). His 
anti-democratic attitude was thus closely connected with his nationalism. It is thus not 
surprising that he aligned himself with the politically conservative Deutsche Volkspartei 
(German People’s Party), which combined a skeptical attitude towards the Weimar Republic 
with a nationalist, elitist, and anti-socialist agenda, and of which he was a member from 1919 
to 1928. 
 
4. The Later Rothacker (1929–1945): Cultural Anthropology  
Rothacker changed the bedrock of his philosophy for a second time when, around 
1930, he followed the anthropological turn in German philosophy (Scheler, Plessner) and took 
a more serious interest in recent developments in biology (Uexküll) and Lebensphilosopie 
(Spengler, Klages). His later theory of culture was first developed in his treatise 
Geschichtsphilosophie (Philosophy of History) in 1934. In 1942, Rothacker published a 
second treatise on the same topic that continued his earlier work, coining the term “cultural 
anthropology” (Kulturanthropologie) for his approach.  
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The fundamental revision of his philosophical thought was accompanied by a political 
radicalization: Rothacker turned to National Socialism even before Hitler’s seizure of power. 
He signed a petition calling for Hitler’s election in July 1932, and became a member of the 
NS Lehrerbund (the Nazi organization for teachers) in November 1932 and of the NSDAP in 
May 1933.vi  
In the following section on Rothacker’s later philosophy, I first sketch his 
methodological and political orientation (a), and then turn to the key motifs of his concept of 
culture (b).  
 
a) Methodological Demarcations and Political Affiliations  
Between his two treatises on the concept of culture, Rothacker (1938) published a 
psychological treatise on personality that positioned his cultural anthropology in relation to 
Völkerpsychologie, now taking a critical position. The chapter on Völkerpsychologie followed 
the contours of general psychology. Rothacker emphasizes that human behavior is always 
shaped by historically contingent cultural norms. He believed that the significance of culture 
and history confronts psychology with two problems. First, the focus on the individual mind 
is not sufficient to explain human characteristics. Second, the cultural level of human 
behavior cannot be adequately examined by experimental methods, which exposes the limited 
scope of causal explanation in psychology. Rothacker concluded that cultural studies had to 
complement Völkerpsychologie. He introduced his cultural anthropology as the theoretical 
and institutional framework that could bring together cultural and psychological studies to 
foster a comprehensive understanding of humanity (Rothacker 1938, 71–78).  
Rothacker’s proposal for examining the cultural aspect of human behavior was 
hermeneutic in a broad sense: He emphasized that humans behaved in meaningful ways and 
that human phenomena should by examined by a descriptive analysis of the “plain experience 
of life” (schlichte Lebenserfahrung; 1934, 42). This hermeneutic approach demanded a 
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comparative study of the historical forms of human life. Rothacker’s method was still visibly 
inspired by Dilthey. 
In this later period of his work, Rothacker rejected naturalism and often criticized 
causal explanations of human behavior. He dismissed biology, psychology, 
Völkerpsychologie, sociology, and existing forms of philosophical anthropology because of 
their naturalistic concept of humanity (Rothacker 1934, 19, f., 22, 41–43, 1942/1948, 61 f.). In 
contrast to the alleged one-sidedness of naturalism, Rothacker promised a “synthetic science 
of the human being” (synthetische Wissenschaft vom Menschen) that considered all aspects of 
human life: nature and spirit, origin and tradition, lawfulness and spontaneity, knowledge and 
deed (1942/1948, 61 f., 192, 197 f., 1934, 37, 144 f.).  
Rothacker criticized contemporary sociology from another angle as well. He now 
claimed that human communities had to be transformed into a unified Volk before they were 
capable of developing an advanced culture. The Volkswerdung (becoming a Volk) of a group 
was a political act and as such contingent (1942/1948, 93 f.). Rothacker wanted sociology to 
acknowledge the völkisch form of human life, calling for a National Sociology that would 
replace class with Volk (Rothacker 1933). With this nationalist focus, sociology could support 
the new supreme discipline of the humanities, namely Rothacker’s “synthetic science of the 
human.” The völkisch renewal of sociology was a key issue in Rothacker’s public engagement 
in the 1930s: In newspaper articles and speeches he outlined how the human sciences could 
foster the rise of the German nation, envisioning Nazi Germany as a “self-conscious cultural 
state” (selbstbewusster Kulturstaat; Rothacker 1932a).vii 
The later Rothacker was not shy about the political character of his philosophy. He 
emphasized that one of his key thoughts—the significance of proving oneself in a certain 
situation (Bewährung in einer bestimmten Lage; 1942, 64)—was directly drawn from political 
experience. This concept was important in his philosophical reading of National Socialism 
(NS). Rothacker explicitly associated his cultural anthropology with the rise of NS. In the first 
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section of his Geschichtsphilosophie (1934), he claimed that his philosophical approach 
depended on the current historical developments, inasmuch as his philosophy revealed the 
anthropological foundation of the renewal of “folkish consciousness” (volkstümliche 
Bewußtsein; 1934, 3). In the last chapter, entitled “In the Third Reich”, Rothacker argued that 
his philosophy belonged to this new political order, which he presented as a political 
revolution realizing a new image of humanity. He considered NS to be a kind of reality test 
for his cultural anthropology, advancing a reading of Nazi policies from the perspective of his 
theory of culture and justifying them philosophically. He argued that NS was the political 
response of a specific community to an ambivalent situation: On the one hand, an abundance 
of inner forces called for the shaping of the German Volk, yet on the other hand “hateful 
enemies and enviers” (149) threatened this project. NS understood the task that arose from the 
tension between the inner and outer situation: Germany had to assert itself against hostile 
foreign powers. Rothacker claimed that his concept of “proving oneself in a certain situation” 
explained the political primacy of foreign affairs typical of Nazi politics. His cultural 
anthropology aimed to show that the “protection of our sovereignty and borders” (149) had to 
be accompanied by the comprehensive mobilization of inner forces to establish a particular 
attitude (Haltung), which he characterized as being German. Rothacker held that being united 
in a stable attitude gave more strength to a community than any “constitutional crutches” 
(Verfassungskrücken) ever could (150). This conviction matched the self-understanding of NS 
as an ideological movement that shaped all aspects of life, so it is not surprising that 
Rothacker confidently concluded that the rise of this movement confirmed his philosophy of 
history. He also emphasized the philosophical significance of the guiding principles of the 
movement’s ideology, arguing that the Nazi concepts of “state,” “Volk,” “race,” and “Führer” 
contributed to the self-understanding of humanity and corresponded to his cultural 
anthropology (145–148).  
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Rothacker belonged among the many philosophers who welcomed National Socialism 
because of its promise to realize a new concept of the human (for a detailed account of the 
philosophical collaboration with NS see Sluga 1993; Wolters 1999; Sieg 2013). Philosophers 
such as Alfred Baeumler (1887–1968), Ernst Krieck (1882-1947), and Arnold Gehlen (1904–
1976) defined their own task as establishing a new conception of humanity in the realm of 
theory, corresponding to the new political reality. Anthropology thus became an important 
way to understand National Socialism philosophically. In this context, Rothacker’s focus on 
culture made his approach stand out. 
 
b) The Key Motifs of Rothacker’s Cultural Anthropology  
Völkisch particularism was at the core of Rothacker’s cultural anthropology. Rothacker 
construed history as the struggle of particular communities for the realization of their life and 
their world (1934, 38). Human history was shaped by the cultural existence of those Völker 
who constituted the peak of human excellence. Only these communities possessed historical 
significance; all other “human societies” were justifiably forgotten (see, e.g., 1934, 53). 
Philosophy thus had to provide insight into the “life laws of Völker” (Lebensgesetze der 
Völker; 1934, 5), which Rothacker attempted to do by clarifying how human societies 
developed into advanced cultures (Hochkulturen).  
The later Rothacker defined Völker as the “bearers and creators” of all “moral, 
cultural, and spiritual life” (38). Völker were characterized both biologically and culturally: 
Rothacker held that Völker rested on biological groups (families, clans, tribes, and the like) 
which ensured continuity over time, while a shared a way of life provided common spiritual 
forms. A Volk established a specific attitude in its struggle with the natural and social 
environment. The principles of these struggles were: “digest and assimilate” and “eat and be 
eaten” (38). Rothacker’s basic concept of communities was thus social Darwinist, with his 
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explicit assumption that the life of human communities was analogous to the life of organisms 
or a species (38). 
Rothacker developed an existentialist understanding of the collective life of humanity. 
He regarded communities as thrown into a certain “situation” (Lage) which called for an 
adequate “response” (Antwort): A community had to prove itself. Only a “good idea” (guter 
Einfall) triggered a course of action that lead to a successful response to the challenges of the 
world. The lived experience of collective agents was the horizon of both the idea and the 
response, both of which were entirely relative to the communal lived experience. Rothacker 
illustrated this fundamental structure of human life by describing the situation of a sail boat in 
a heavy sea. Strong winds and heavy swells called for certain responses. The sailors had to 
master the challenge by their coordinated activity. Rothacker used this same example to 
illustrate his thought that over time and with experience sailors formed habits that helped 
them to answer their maritime challenges effectively (44 f.). In a similar way, he thought that 
stable attitudes (Haltungen) formed the core of a people’s specific “styles of life” (Lebenstile) 
and were thus the foundation of human cultures. Consequently, Rothacker understood the 
sailors’ attitudes as the core of a maritime style of life. When this style of life shaped and 
unified all vital expressions of a sailing community, a veritable “sailors’ culture” emerged 
(46).  
Rothacker held that cultures were rooted in a shared way of life. Cultures emerge 
when the specific attitude of a community finally is molded into a “characteristic form” 
(durchgeprägte Form), which shapes all areas of life. Rothacker defined the “characteristic 
form” of Kulturvölker (cultural people) as particular, collective, public, homogeneous, 
comprehensive, and productive. He claimed, for example, that there was a unique Roman 
style that characterized Roman heads, Roman architecture, each sentence of Roman 
historiography, each trait of Roman morality, and so on. This Roman identity was a basic 
disposition transmitted and modified from generation to generation and constituted the 
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essence of being Roman, in which all members of the Roman community participated (73–79, 
1942/1948, 68 f.). For Rothacker, “reduction” was a historical method, inasmuch as he 
assumed that the manifold products of a culture could be reduced to a specific “mental form” 
(seelische Form). The general tendency of the Volksgeist was expressed in the particular 
world of shaped forms. Here the cultural form should be understood as an expression of the 
spiritual life of a Volk (1934, 120–132, 1942/1948, 147–150).  
Rothacker considered cultures to be separate and internally uniform entities, even 
though the unity of a style of life was never simply given. He viewed culture as the permanent 
task of shaping self and world. He emphasized that only permanent pressure and forceful 
coercion could facilitate the highest cultural achievements. A cultural style had to prove its 
productivity, preserve its unity, and succeed in the struggle with its environment. Social 
differences within a community could give rise to different versions of its specific style. For 
instance, Rothacker drew an analogy between how the style of the “leading classes” 
(Führungsschichten) and that of the “root classes” (Wurzelschichten) differ, and the 
difference between the spiritual and physiological expression of a culture. It was, however, 
essential that the unity of the cultural style be preserved, since the emergence of different 
class styles could endanger the unity of a culture (1942/1948, 178 ff.). Here Rothacker’s 
social conservatism surfaced again: The imperative to stay in line suppresses the 
emancipatory struggle of social groups underrepresented in the cultural style of a given 
community.  
In his 1934 treatise, Rothacker used the concept of “substance” to signify the 
persisting character of collective attitudes and cultural styles (70, 113–117; see also 
1942/1948, 67). Race was defined as one aspect of the “complex substance” of a culture. The 
later Rothacker understood race as a natural potential that had to be realized through 
“breeding” and “shaping.” This led to an acknowledged methodological problem: Since races 
were only known in their historical form of Völker, only their phenotypes could be identified 
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(1934, 136 f.). From this Rothacker concluded the “issue of race” (Rassenfrage) did not 
necessarily require a biologistic approach that identified natural dispositions and used them as 
causal explanations (1934, 41, 136 f., 1942/1948, 193–195). He praised the work of Ludwig 
Ferdinand Clauß, who studied alleged racial types using a hermeneutic method (1934, 41; 
1942/1948, 78). Clauß believed that the physiological and mental expressions of communities 
revealed the soul of their race (Rassenseele), claiming that the character of a race could only 
be understood by witnessing (Mitleben) its special way of life (Clauß 1926/1933).viii This 
understanding of race was compatible with anti-naturalism.   
The later Rothacker rejected the social determinism that he associated with sociology 
in particular (Rothacker 1934, 117–120, 1933, 1932b), yet he did not give up the belief in the 
priority of the community. In comparison to his middle period, Rothacker developed a more 
complex understanding of the relationship between the individual and its collective 
affiliations. In his later work, Rothacker thought the life of each human being took place in a 
culture whose collective substance determined the character of all individual acts, thus 
shaping a person’s identity (1942/1948, 192). Yet, this cultural disposition could also 
transform into a situation (Lage) in which the individual had scope for decisions, and 
individual action could modify culture. Rothacker also mentioned the possibility of 
completely abandoning of one’s cultural dispositions, though he warned against the use of 
absolute freedom and emphasized its futility. Individuals were creative only within their 
native culture. Rothacker emphasized that a culturally-shaped individual was “substantially 
enriched” but not “causally tied” (1934, 115 f.). He embraced the dominance of collective 
dispositions, but rejected causal interpretations of how the individual interacts with these (see 
also 1932b, 13–15).  
In his later work, Rothacker assumed that his particularistic understanding of cultures 
would invite the charge of relativism. He thus examines the problem of relativism again, but 
restricts his discussion to epistemology (1934, 86, 1942/1948, 177). He still believes that 
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practical interests played a constitutive role for knowing, though he also emphasizes the 
significance of desires and emotions for epistemic pursuits. The later Rothacker draws 
connections between his characterization of the human epistemic situation and the pragmatic 
criterion of truth encountered in his middle work. He distinguishes between relevant and 
irrelevant truths, claiming that this pragmatic dimension does not affect the correctness of 
epistemic claims (1934, 94–99, 1942/1948, 162–166). In contrast to his middle phase, the 
later Rothacker rejects the label of “relativism” for his view, emphasizing its realistic core. 
Divergent perspectives select between different aspects of the same reality, which he 
illustrates by way of a simple example: The same place can be spontaneously interpreted by a 
farmer as a wood, a forester as a forest, a hunter as a hunting ground, and a fugitive as a 
hiding place (1934, 85 f., 1942/1948, 161, 170 f.). Rothacker argues that the interpretations 
corresponding to each set of interests, desires, and emotions were objective knowledge about 
the world. He also claims that diverging worldviews do not contradict each other on an 
epistemic level (173). However, the different styles of life remain in practical conflict about 
which world and life was “truly worth” (wahrhaft würdig) living (1934, 99). Communities 
had to prove the value of their attitudes in a struggle with other communities, with the winner 
being credited with a better answer to the challenges of life and, hence, a superior style of life. 
The later Rothacker did not consider whether this position amounted to value relativism, since 
he restricted the problem of relativism to epistemology.     
In the 1930s and 40s, Rothacker developed a new theory of culture that included key 
motifs of his earlier works: He kept the hermeneutical orientation of his Diltheyan period and 
rejected naturalistic approaches to culture, while advancing revised versions of the 
existentialist concept of life and the cultural particularism that characterized his middle work. 
Rothacker’s later philosophy thus is often read as an anthropological foundation for his theory 
of worldviews (Stöwer 2012a, 2012b; Tremmel 2012, 2009; Plas 2011; Fischer 2008). There 
are, however, also connections to key convictions of his early work, despite the explicit 
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critique of the biologistic concept of culture that the early work embraced. The later 
Rothacker was still a social Darwinist who worked with analogies between human and natural 
life—although he developed a different concept of life. He regarded cultures as expressions of 
the spiritual life of human communities, believed in the priority of community, and retained 
the old hostility towards sociology. But he distinguished his culturalism from all kinds of 
causal determinism and claimed that it left room for individual freedom. Rothacker’s völkisch 
anthropology was guided by normative interests and was intended to justify both cultural and 
social hierarchies. It thus should not surprise us that Rothacker granted völkerpsychological 
examination a place in his “synthetic science of the human”, nor that he should present his 
cultural anthropology as the long-overdue comprehensive answer to issues first raised by 
Völkerpsychologie. The later Rothacker’s discussion of relativism is a special case: While he 
kept central thoughts from his middle work, he restricted his discussion to epistemology. He 
emphasized the realistic core of his perspectivism in order to distinguish his view from 
relativism. Rothacker’s later work was characterized by an anti-relativistic tendency.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
The analysis above focuses on two aspects of Rothacker’s philosophy of culture. First, the 
significance of Völkerpsychologie and Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie for the development of 
Rothacker’s philosophical thought is emphasized. The paper begins by sketching Rothacker’s 
völkerpsychological beginnings and analyzing his early biologist concept of culture. Then the 
analysis turns to Rothacker’s Diltheyan philosophy of the human sciences, showing that, in 
the middle period of his work, Rothacker revised his understanding of human culture in line 
with ideas associated with historicism. He developed a theory of worldviews, embraced an 
existentialist concept of life, and deepened his particularism. The paper concludes by 
evaluating the second fundamental revision of Rothacker’s philosophy, arguing that his 
cultural anthropology is best seen as a development of motifs of his earlier works. While the 
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straightforward link between his middle and later work is acknowledged by most 
commentators, I also pointed to the more subtle connection to his early work on culture. The 
later Rothacker rejected naturalism, but retained certain convictions that were now justified by 
the culturalist framework of his völkisch anthropology.    
Second, this paper emphasizes the political aspect of Rothacker’s philosophy, showing 
that his different approaches to human culture shared a conservative tendency that 
corresponded to his political affiliation during the Weimar Republic and under NS. This 
political conservativism was deeply entrenched in Rothacker’s theories of culture, which are 
presented here as different forms of völkisch thinking exhibiting a common pattern of 
assumptions about humanity—despite their important differences. Rothacker’s philosophical 
approaches were always guided by normative interests. They carved the world up into unified 
entities whose members shared a particular identity. Rothacker emphasized the competition 
among these collective entities and ranked them according to their alleged achievements, 
assuming a deep distance between different forms of human life, and essentializing social 
differences by analyzing them in terms of natural or cultural characteristics. Finally, 
Rothacker always placed the community above the individual, thus attempting to justify 
nationalism philosophically. Since his philosophy was shaped by the reception of 
Völkerpsychologie and Lebensphilosophie, the political orientation of his thought 




Böhnigk, Volker. 2002. Kulturanthropologie als Rassenlehre: nationalsozialistische 
Kulturphilosophie aus der Sicht des Philosophen Erich Rothacker. Würzburg: 
Königshausen und Neumann.  
26 
 
Chickering, Roger. 1993. Karl Lamprecht: a German Academic Life (1856–1915). Atlantic 
Highlands/NJ: Humanities Press. 
Clauß, Ludwig F. 1926/1933. Rasse und Seele. 3rd ed. München: Lehmann.  
Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1962. The Essence of Philosophy. Trans. Stephen Emery and William 
Emery. Chapel Hill: The University of Carolina Press. 
Fischer, Joachim. 2008, Philosophische Anthropologie. Eine Denkrichtung des 20. 
Jahrhunderts, Freiburg: Alber.  
Habermas, Jürgen. 1958/1973. “Philosophische Anthropologie.” In Kultur und Kritik: 
verstreute Aufsätze, 89–111. Repr. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.  
Klautke, Egbert. 2013. The Mind of the Nation: Völkerpsychologie in Germany, 1851-1955. 
New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Koonz, Claudia. 2003. The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Koslowski, Peter. 1997. “A Philosophy of the Historical School: Erich Rothacker’s Theory of 
the Geisteswissenschaften.” In Methodology of the Social Sciences, Ethics, and Economics 
in the Newer Historical School, ed. Koslowski, 510–529. Berlin: Springer.  
Kroll, Frank-Lothar. 1998. Utopie als Ideologie. Geschichtsdenken und politisches Handeln 
im Dritten Reich, Paderborn: Schöningh. 
Kusch, Martin. 1995. Psychologism. London and New York: Routledge.  
———. 2019. “From Völkerpsychologie to the Sociology of Knowledge.” HOPOS, 
forthcoming.  
Plas, Guillame. 2011. “Philosophische Anthropologie als Anti-Soziologie. Erich Rothackers 
früher Entwurf einer Kulturanthropologie im theoretischen Feld der Weimarer Republik.” 
In Konkurrenz der Paradigmata. Zum Entstehungskontext der philosophischen 
Anthropologie, ed. Plas and Gérad Raulet, 471–494. Nordhausen: Bautz. 
27 
 
———. 2013. “Ernst Cassirers und Erich Rothackers Kulturmorphologien. Von der 
ideologischen Offenheit des Historismus.” In Philosophische Anthropologie und Politik, 
ed. Plas, Raulet, and Manfred Gangl, 199–217. Nordhausen: Bautz. 
Raphael, Lutz. 1990. „Historikerkontroversen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Berufhabitus, 
Fächerkonkurrenz und sozialen Deutungsmustern.“ Historische Zeitschrift 252:325–363. 
Rothacker, Erich. 1909. “Über die Möglichkeit der Völkerpsychologie.” Zeitschrift für 
angewandte Psychologie und Charakterkunde 2:382–392. 
———. 1912. Über die Möglichkeit und den Ertrag einer genetischen Geschichtsschreibung 
im Sinne Karl Lamprechts. Leipzig: Voigtländer.  
———. 1920. Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaft. Tübingen: Mohr. 
———. 1926. Logik und Systematik der Geisteswissenschaften. München and Berlin: 
Oldenbourg.  
———. 1932a. “Neue Wege des Hochschulwesens.” In Hochschulfragen. Eine Sammlung 
von Vorträgen, ed. Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 48– 54. Köln: Bachem. 
———. 1932b. “Überbau und Unterbau, Theorie und Praxis.” Schmollers Jahrbuch 56:1–16 
———. 1933. “Nationale Soziologie.” Westdeutsche Akademische Rundschau 3:1. 
———. 1934. Geschichtsphilosophie. München and Berlin: Oldenbourg.  
———. 1938. Die Schichten der Persönlichkeit. Leipzig: Barth. 
———. 1942/1948. Probleme der Kulturanthropologie. Repr. Bonn: Bouvier. 
———. 1963. Heitere Erinnerungen. Frankfurt/M.: Athenäum. 
Schorn-Schütte, Luise. 1984. Karl Lamprecht: Kulturgeschichtsschreibung zwischen 
Wissenschaft und Politik. Göttingen: V&R.   
Sieg, Ulrich. 2013. Geist und Gewalt. Deutsche Philosophen zwischen Kaiserreich und 
Nationalsozialismus. München: Hanser.  
Simmel, Georg. 1908. “Über das Wesen der Sozialpsychologie.” Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 26:285–291. 
28 
 
Sluga, Hans. 1993. Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany. 
Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Stöwer, Ralph. 2012a. Erich Rothacker: Sein Leben und seine Wissenschaft vom Menschen. 
Göttingen: V&R University Press.  
———. 2012b. “Rothackers Kulturphilosophie in biographisch-zeitgeschichtlicher 
Perspektive.” FIB 1:49–58. 
Tremmel, Frank. 2009. “Menschheitswissenschaft” als Erfahrung des Ortes. Erich Rothacker 
und die deutsche Kulturanthropologie. München: Utz. 
———. 2012. “Leben in Begriffen. Erich Rothackers Kulturanthropologie als historische 
Semantik der ‘existentiellen Reduktion.’” FIB 1:59–64. 
Weber, Thomas. 1989. “Arbeit am Imaginären des Deutschen. Erich Rothackers Ideen für 
eine NS-Kulturpolitik.” In Deutsche Philosophen 1933, ed. Wolfgang F. Haug, 23–39. 
Reinbek/Hamburg: Argument. 
Wolters, Gereon. 1999. “Der ‘Führer’ und seine Denker. Zur Philosophie des ‘Dritten 
Reichs.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 47:223‒251. 
Wundt, Wilhelm. 1886/1911. “Ziele und Wege der Völkerpsychologie.” In Probleme der 
Völkerpsychologie, 1-35. Leipzig: Wiegandt. 
 
i Since there is no established English translation of the term Völkerpsychologie, I use the 
German term in my paper. 
ii For a more detailed account see Stöwer 2012a, 31–52. 
iii For the significance of Simmel in the context of Völkerpsychologie see Kusch 2019. 
iv Examining the question why Rothacker changed his philosophical views after WWI would 
require a detailed analysis of Rothacker’s work and life during the war that extends the scope 
of this paper (see Stöwer 2012a, 52–56).  
                                                 
29 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
v For the nationalist tendencies of German philosophy during and after WWI see Sieg 2013. 
vi For a detailed account of Rothacker’s political involvement in NS see Stöwer 2012a, 113–
154. 
vii For the political aspect of Rothacker’s critique of sociology see Plas 2013.  
viii For the significance of non-biologistic concepts of race for Nazi ideology see, e.g., Kroll 
1998; Koonz 2003, 190−220. 
